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TThe functioning of today’s modern economies is unimaginable without state interventions. The state, on the one hand, facilitates the functioning of market economy by establishing an appropriate legal environment 
and ensuring that rules are observed and, on 
the other, corrects existing imperfections. 150 
years ago, redistribution amounted to ten per-
cent of GDP in developed economies, whereas 
today this is well over fifty percent (Benczes – 
Kutasi, 2010). In order to function, the state 
needs revenues, the largest portion of which 
is constituted by levied taxes, from which the 
state can finance its own expenses and those of 
the public sector (Kovács, 2010).
Public debt can be defined in two ways, ei-
ther as the aggregate amount of the govern-
ment deficits accumulated in the past, or as 
the present value of the future fixed obliga-
tions of the state. The measure of public debt 
is compared to GDP, because this way the 
rate of the debt burden can be correlated to 
the performance of the economy, and from 
the growth of the ratio one can infer that fu-
ture obligations have increased (czeti – Hoff-
mann, 2006). Public debt is the consequence 
of insufficient external and internal equilib-
rium, the increase of which may result in the 
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decrease of employment and the shrinking of 
the tax base, hence a drop in state revenues.
This paper undertakes to examine the fac-
tors affecting public debt, depending on 
whether the given country is a member of the 
euro area or has an independent monetary pol-
icy. In order to narrow down the topic, we will 
focus on the Visegrád Group (V4) and south 
European countries plus cyprus (hereinafter 
referring to this group as GIPs in short). We 
conducted our empirical study in respect of 
the period from 1996 to 2014. using the one-
step dynamic panel model, we identified the 
factors affecting the development of the pub-
lic debt of the V4 and GIPs countries.
comparison of the V4 and GIPs countries 
is motivated by the capitalism model of these 
two groups, which differs from the continen-
tal model (Farkas, 2011), and the adaptation 
constraints weighing on them, which in the 
case of the former group means the creation 
of market economy, then accession to the Eu, 
and in the case of the latter the creation of the 
euro area and compliance with the rules (e.g. 
stability and Growth Pact).
our preliminary assumption is that the 
results of the two groups will be different, 
as we are examining two groups in different 
economic, financial and cultural situations, 
which at a closer look cannot be regarded ho-
mogeneous at group level either. of the Viseg-
rád countries, in the autumn of 2008 Hun-
gary sought assistance from the IMF and the 
European union, spending the funds largely 
on covering the budget deficit, purchasing 
government securities, and financing a bank 
rescue package. The IMF loan was repaid 
(IMF, 2013), therefore early in 2016 Hungary 
returned to bond market financing. With a 
view to the protection of the banking system 
and the credit market, in May 2009 the Polish 
government signed an agreement with IMF 
for a flexible credit line (FcL), which was last 
renewed on 18 January 2017 (IMF, 2017). Al-
though for members of the euro area the sin-
gle currency promises economic stability and 
growth, a more integrated money market and 
the elimination of exchange rate risks (Euro-
pean commission, 2010), certain Mediterra-
nean countries still needed financial support 
at the time of the crisis. spain since 2008, 
Greece since 2010, Portugal since 2011 and 
cyprus since 2012 has relied on support from 
the European stability Mechanism (EsM2). 
The other countries covered by the review did 
not depend on any external support. Based on 
the current outlook, in order to ensure its sta-
ble banking system Italy will have to request 
external assistance if the government-guar-
anteed EuR 15 billion bond issue of Banca 
Monte dei Paschi di siena (Portfolio, 2016) 
will be insufficient to restore the bank’s liquid-
ity and investor confidence.
As regards the structure of this paper, the 
literature overview presents the factors affect-
ing public debt and the development of the 
public debts of the various countries. This is 
followed by a section describing the method-
ology, variables and results of empirical re-
search, then the discussion of the topic con-
cludes with a summary.
THEoRETICAl MoDEl
Examination of the relationship between 
indebtedness and the economy intensified 
after the financial crisis of 2008 and the 
euro crisis of 2010–2011. The studies mostly 
examined the role of debt in the formation of 
financial crises, its negative impact on long-
term growth and the issue of the sustainability 
of debt (Barcza, 2015). our study aims to 
contribute to this latter topic.
When creating the theoretical model, we 
seek answers to the following questions: which 
variables should be included in the research? Is 
it necessary to incorporate temporal dynam-
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ics? Will the individual variables have positive 
or negative values?
The volume of public debt influences the 
rate of interest expenses payable on debt. 
A country that has higher public debt will 
also have higher interest expenses. Interest 
rate is affected by risks, expectations as well 
as risk premiums. Public debt-to-GDP ratio is 
fundamentally affected by the following vari-
ables: the primary balance of the budget, real 
interest rates, real exchange rate, economic 
growth (Hoffmann, 2011; Deli – Mosolygó, 
2009), as well as inflation and other factors 
(czeti – Hoffmann, 2008). Figure 1 shows the 
relationship between public debt and the fac-
tors affecting it.
High public debt determines subsequent 
expenditure levels as well, to cover which 
revenues have to be increased. Higher rev-
enues can be achieved by taxation. Economic 
growth may ensure that public debt is held 
within fair limits. If revenues increase and ex-
penses can be kept below the level of growth 
of revenues, then the primary balance with-
out interest payment would improve through 
economic growth. All this would be somewhat 
counteracted by the increase in interest rates. 
If domestic savings are insufficient, it is nec-
essary to finance indebtedness from abroad, 
which leads to the deterioration of the balance 
of payments. The decrease of savings has an 
increasing effect on real interest rates, which 
causes private investments to dwindle, de-
creasing the stocks of capital, potential output 
and employment (orbán – szapáry, 2006). 
changes in the real exchange rate, including 
in particular its devaluation, change not only 
the value of outstanding debts denominated 
in foreign currencies, but a higher public 
debt-to-GDP ratio impacts higher interest 
rates, potential GDP growth and the dete-
rioration of primary balance, hence it affects 
fiscal sustainability as well (Martínez carrera 
– Vergara, 2012). At the end of this process, 
the country may enter into a negative spiral 
(Török, 2012). The rejection of debt service or 
the generation of hyperinflation would cause 
serious damage to the economy, therefore 
budgetary adjustments, austerity measures 
and ad hoc reforms3 are needed: cost cuts, the 
introduction of taxes, reforms in the financ-
ing of retirement pension, healthcare and ed-
ucation provide opportunities for restraining 
public debt (Tarafás, 2016). The costs of debt 
financing can be moderated with the decrease 
of risk premium, which can be achieved with 
the permanent decrease of long-term yields. 
All this can be implemented with the support 
of a transparent, prudent and sustainable fis-
cal policy.
The relationship between GDP growth and 
public debt was examined by Reinhart – Rogoff 
(2010a), who established that up to a public 
debt-to-GDP ratio of 90 percent, any increase 
in the level of debt increases GDP, whereas 
above this threshold increasing debt has a re-
ducing effect on GDP. Herndon et al. (2014)4 
repeated the tests of Reinhart and Rogoff for 
the period between 1946 and 2009 in respect 
of 20 developed countries, and concluded that 
the authors made selection, coding, weight-
ing and calculation errors. They, furthermore, 
showed that there is no significant difference 
between the average and median GDP growth 
of countries having public debts below or 
above the threshold. Public debt and GDP 
growth differed significantly from country 
to country and from period to period, there-
fore, they denied Reinhart and Rogoff’s asser-
tion that public debt in excess of 90 percent 
of GDP consistently decreases the country’s 
growth.
The current account balance reflects ex-
ternal debt. In a Keynesian framework, with 
the reduction of competitiveness the deficit 
of the balance of payments increases, which 
has a decreasing effect on aggregate demand, 
therefore, inevitably leads to the increase of 
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budgetary expenses, public debt and interest 
rates, which causes the further deterioration 
of the external balance (Holmes, 2006). In 
the periphery countries, the increase of the 
current account deficit is generated by do-
mestic demand, credit boom and the finan-
cial cycle, and less by the competitiveness of 
prices (semmler – Tahri, 2017). Therefore, 
it shows the fragility of a country if the cur-
rent account balance has significant effect on 
public debt. south European countries (and 
Ireland) had accumulated significant current 
account deficit in the years before the crisis 
(Figure 2), whereas Northern euro area coun-
tries had a surplus, and thus became creditors 
of the system. In the course of the crisis, as a 
result of the sudden liquidity shock, southern 
countries depended on the financial support 
of Northern countries, which forced them to 
adopt severe austerity measures. According to 
De Grauwe (2016), both the debtor and the 
creditor states are responsible for imbalances. 
The former should not have taken so much 
credit, and the latter should not have allowed 
them do so.
Inflation has a dual effect on the balance of 
public finances – on the one hand, the govern-
ment has revenues from inflation tax and on 
the other, the interest payable on the internal 
debt of the country should compensate for 
inflation, which may result in surplus expen-
ditures (Erdős, 1999). Low inflation and bal-
anced public finances contribute to sustaina-
ble growth. With the moderation of inflation, 
lower interest rates and risks can be achieved. 
The improvement of the budgetary position 
Figure 2
changes in the current account balance in relation to gdp  
in south european countries, 2004–2015 (%)
Source: Eurostat database
Greece                       Spain                             Italy                           Cyprus           Portugal
 Focus – Fiscal assets in practice 
Public Finance Quarterly  2017/4 449
results in a lower financing burden on public 
finances. There is no relationship in developed 
countries between inflation and the level of 
public debt, whereas the inflation of emerg-
ing countries rises sharply upon the growth of 
public debt (Reinhart– Rogoff, 2010b). Infla-
tion affects internal debt, since the interest 
paid on internal debt must compensate for in-
flation as well. In the interest burden of exter-
nal debt, real interest has predominant weight 
(Erdős, 1999). Examining the relationship 
between the state budget and inflation based 
on a Hungarian data series comprising nine 
years (1999–2007), Miklós-Somogyi – Balogh 
(2010) found that with the increase of infla-
tion the budget improved, and deteriorated in 
the opposite case. When examining the effects 
on revenues and expenditures separately, it 
was found that the effects counterbalance each 
other, and all in all inflation has no effect on 
the budgetary position, with only an indirect 
effect assumed. As in our research we focused 
on public debt as a whole, without breaking it 
down into its constituents, inflation is used in 
this paper as an explanatory variable.
With the increase of unemployment, the 
government is forced to spend more on the 
labour market and (where applicable) retire-
ment pension, which increases public debt 
(ono, 2015; Battaglini – coate, 2015), there-
fore, the effect of the labour market may also 
be included among the other factors affecting 
public debt. However, economic growth may 
also start without the increase in employ-
ment, which is called “jobless growth”. This 
phenomenon was observed in the us in the 
periods following the worldwide economic 
depression of 1929–33, the oil crisis, as well 
as the shocks of the 1990s and 2000s (Botos, 
2013; Martus, 2015). Employment rate is, at 
the same time, one of the sustainability indi-
cators of the European union (European un-
ion, 2015), and as such also included in our 
empirical research.
our theoretical model, which we tested 
on empirical data (V4 and GIPs), can be ex-




Where public debt in the given period is 
denoted by Dt, public debt in the previous pe-
riod by Dt–1, deficit by Bt–1, real interest rate 
by rt–1, real effective exchange rate by REERt–1, 
GDP by ΔGDPt–1, current account deficit by 
CAt–1 and inflation by πt–1. constant is ω, and 
random error is εt.
THE SAMPlE
Before the crisis of 2008, monetary policy 
was focused on achieving stable, low inflation 
by means of changing the central bank’s 
key policy rate. Fiscal policy had a rather 
restricted role at the time, as it was believed 
that consumption is not determined by 
current income. The Ricardian equivalence is 
not true in so far as it is not the same whether 
the state finances itself from credit or from 
taxes, and in the long run state intervention 
has no effect on the vertical aggregate supply 
curve. Besides economic considerations, 
there were practical arguments as well against 
fiscal policy, namely that its implementation 
is complicated, it has a delayed effect, and it 
is highly influenced by politics. The outbreak 
of the crisis called attention to the fact that 
monetary policy in itself is insufficient, and 
in the course of crisis management the active 
use of fiscal policy is also needed (Blanchard 
et al., 2010).
countries joining the euro area lose their 
independent monetary policies, no longer 
have a national currency of their own, may not 
use the tools of issuing money or devaluating 
their currency and must also do without an 
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independent interest rate policy. In exchange, 
however, they can enjoy the advantages of 
a low interest rate environment (Benczes – 
Kutasi, 2010).
As regards the funding of public finances, 
the Treaty on the Functioning of the Euro-
pean union (TFEu) provided that the cen-
tral banks of the member states cannot pur-
chase government securities directly. Due to 
the crisis, this rule was cancelled5 with the 
launching of the EcB’s “Outright Monetary 
Transactions” (oMT) programme. The basic 
purpose of the programme is to ensure mon-
etary transmission and a single monetary 
policy (EcB, 2012). The oMT stopped the 
rise of bond market yields, thereby improving 
the funding options of public finances (Lent-
ner, 2015). The central banks of the euro area 
may effect payments to the central budget 
from their operating incomes in the form of 
dividend or tax, with a view to the reduction 
of the budget deficit. The foundation for this 
is provided by a low inflation environment. 
For the majority of the countries, the loss of 
seigniorage revenues did not result in any de-
crease of central bank profitability. Non-euro 
area countries – such as Hungary – are free 
to use the option of issuing money indepen-
dently or making foreign exchange transac-
tions. It might occur, however, that the losses 
of the central bank impair the situation of 
the budget (Novák – Vámos, 2014). The case 
of the czech National Bank – operating be-
tween 2002 and 2014 with negative equity6 
– also belongs here.
The countries covered by the empirical re-
search are members of the European union 
(cohesion countries). It is a common feature 
of the countries of the Visegrád Group7 that 
until 1990, they carried on a socialist eco-
nomic policy dominated by the soviet union. 
The change of political regimes in these coun-
tries was followed by a long transformation 
process, with liberalisation, stabilisation and 
privatisation processes going on simultane-
ously, as a result of which they developed a 
peculiar form of the institutional system of 
capitalism,8 evolving into market economies. 
After this convergence process – which may 
be called a success – they joined the European 
union in 2004. convergence proved success-
ful up until the eruption of the crisis.
The institutional system of the Visegrád 
and Mediterranean countries differs signifi-
cantly from those of the old member states of 
the European union, but there are common 
points as well. Having joined the European 
union in the 1980s, Greece, Portugal and 
spain were regarded as success stories within 
the history of the Eu, constituting examples 
to be followed for post-socialist countries un-
til the crisis of 2008. Then it came to light that 
the low interest rates accompanying euro area 
membership had led to external and internal 
imbalances in these countries. underlying the 
imbalances were not only structural, but insti-
tutional factors as well (Farkas, 2013). From 
the countries of the Mediterranean, this pa-
per deals only with the GIPs countries9 and 
cyprus. In these countries, the expectation of 
country-specific shocks has significant effect 
on the preferences of institutional investors 
for domestic markets, resulting in self-fulfill-
ing market sentiments. currently, it is a com-
mon feature of these countries that they are 
all struggling with grave economic problems. 
A huge increase of budget deficit and public 
debt could be seen in all as a result of the cri-
sis, to finance which they had to take different 
EcB and IMF loan packages (cornand et al., 
2016).
In the following section of this paper, we 
will examine the development of the public 
debt of the countries under review (Figure 3). 
From 2000 (as no earlier data are available 
on Eu averages) until 2005, the public debt 
of the V4 was below the European union av-
erage, and between 2006 and 2011 only the 
 Focus – Fiscal assets in practice 
Public Finance Quarterly  2017/4 451
debt of Hungary exceeded this value. As re-
gards the GIPs countries, the data of Greece 
and Italy exceeded the Eu average by about 
40 percentage points already before the crisis. 
Between 1995 and 2001, the debt of Portugal 
and spain was at around a similar level, bare-
ly exceeding the 60 percent threshold, then 
in 2002–2008 the Portuguese debt started a 
slow, then after 2009 a rather robust growth. 
spain managed to remain below the Eu aver-
age until 2012 regarding its public debt, al-
though between 2007 and 2012 the value of 
debt in relation to GDP more than doubled. 
It can be said in general that in the recession 
following the crisis, the huge increase of pub-
lic debt-to-GDP ratios occurred not only be-
cause of the voluminous growth of debt, but 
on account of the decrease of GDP as well. 
As regards the public debt of cyprus, until 
2008 it was at around the Eu average, barely 
exceeding the threshold, but due to the crisis 
it has been showing significant increase since 
2009. The czech Republic was fortunate in 
that due to a prudent economic policy, the ap-
plication of an inflation targeting regime and 
austerity packages introduced in the course of 
the crisis, they managed to keep public debt 
at a low level (Hlédik et al., 2016).
A common feature of the two groups of 
countries is that the reason they were hit so 
severely by the crisis is because in addition 
to a dynamically increasing inflow of foreign 
capital, they were characterised by a low rate 
of internal savings, therefore they were strug-
gling with a current account deficit and real 
exchange rate appreciation. In the course of 
Figure 3
development oF public debt-to-gdp ratio in the countries under review  
and in the european union between 1995–2017 (%)
Source: AMECo database
Czech Republic Spain Greece
Hungary Poland Portugal
Cyprus Slovakia European Union (average)
Italy
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the crisis, confidence was shaken, and capi-
tal withdrawals, falling stock prices, cDs 
premiums and the increase of the yields of 
government securities were observed (Farkas, 
2012).
DATA AnD METHoDoloGy
The purpose of the empirical research is to 
examine the development of the key factors 
affecting public debt in the two groups of 
countries. Preparing forecasts is not among 
the objectives of this paper. As we are working 
with macroeconomic data, we can assume 
there is correlation among the variables, and 
the existence of the autocorrelation of random 
errors does not affect the unbiasedness of the 
estimation (Ramanathan, 2003).
The empirical research was carried out 
with the one-step dynamic panel model, us-
ing the Gretl programme. Panel regression can 
be used in respect of databases in which the 
attributes of several units (in this case coun-
tries) and several periods can be collected. 
Panel models break down variance according 
to time and individual dimensions (Kotosz, 
2016). If there are more than two periods, the 
usual estimation procedure is not difference 
generation – the time average typical of the 
individual is deducted from all data, but this 
does not affect interpretation. The advantage 
of panel regression is that the specific attrib-
utes of the individual that are constant over 
time need not be observable, because constant 
factors are dropped from the estimated equa-
tion (Major, 2013).
If the number of variables is high, the 
length of the time series is relatively short and 
the result variable is autocorrelated, the use 
of the dynamic panel model is accepted. The 
model is based on an AR(1) process, where the 
yit result variable is explained with its own de-
layed values (as a way of managing the endo-
geneity problem) by means of the μi  variable 
specific and vit zero mean value uncorrelated 
random errors (accepted for fixed effect panel 
regressions) (Blundell – Bond, 1998; Arellano 
– Bond, 1991):
yit = αyit–1 + μi + vit, i=1, ..., n, t=1, ..., Ti (2)
This is complemented with the incorpo-
ration of the xit explanatory variables in the 
model:
yit = αyit–1 + βxit + μi + vit, i=1, ..., n,  
t=1, ..., Ti
(3)
with the following constraints:
yit = βxit + fi + ξit, where ξit = αξit–1 + vi 
and μi = (1– α) fi, | α |< 1
(4)
We checked the overidentification of the 
model with the sargan test, the result of which 
showed that the model is not overidentified 
(the value p>0.05 was received as a result).
The variables used in the course of the re-
search and their sources are shown in Table 1 
below.
For the public debt-to-GDP ratio, consoli-
dated gross government debt10 was taken into 
account, for which the Annual Macro-Eco-
nomic Database of the European commission 
(AMEco) uses the European system of Inte-
grated National Accounts (EsA). The consoli-
dated government debt of the central budget 
is defined as per Article 1 (5) of council Reg-
ulation (Ec) No 475/2000 amending Regula-
tion (Ec) No 3605/93. “Government debt” 
means the total gross debt at nominal value 
outstanding at the end of the year of the sector 
of “general government” (s.13), with the ex-
ception of those liabilities the corresponding 
financial assets of which are held by the sec-
tor of “general government” (s.13). Govern-
ment debt is constituted by the liabilities of 
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general government in the following catego-
ries: currency and deposits (AF.2);11 securities 
other than shares, excluding financial deriva-
tives (AF.33)12 and loans (AF.4).13 Liabilities 
are taken into account at their nominal value 
outstanding at the end of the year. Liabilities 
denominated in a foreign currency and other 
agreements booked in foreign currencies shall 
be converted into the national currency on the 
basis of the representative market exchange 
rate prevailing on the last working day of each 
year (AMEco, 2016).
General government deficit data are from 
Eurostat’s Government Finance statistics 
(GFs) database, where the data are calculated 
in accordance with the methodology used in 
the course of the excessive deficit procedure 
(EDP). In the course of the excessive deficit 
procedure, the aggregation rules of EsA are 
taken into account. The data are presented 
in the national currency and in euro, and 
also as percentages of GDP. In the course of 
the research, the percentage point value was 
taken into account. The deficit surplus of the 
government will match the government’s net 
creditor/borrower position. According to the 
definition of the EsA standard, government 
debt is the difference of the total revenues and 
total expenditures of the government (Euro-
stat, 2016).
The real interest rate ratio denotes the 
short-term real interest rate, which is calcu-
lated with the following formula: 
Real interest rate = (nominal 
interest rate – GDP deflator) GDP deflator +1
100
where nominal interest rate denotes the 
(usually 3-month) interbank interest rates of 
the different countries, and the GDP deflator 
is the quotient of GDP calculated at market 
rates and GDP calculated at constant rates, 
expressed in percentages, in accordance with 
the EsA 8.89 methodology (AMEco 2016).
Economic growth means the annual per-
centage growth of GDP, calculated in the na-
tional currency, at 2010 rates, which is con-
verted into us dollars. Aggregation is done 
by annual weighted averages (World Bank, 
2016).
Inflation rate is measured by the World 
Bank with the annual percentage change of 
the consumer price index, using Laspeyres’ 
Table 1 
indicators used in the course oF the research
indicator name unit of measurement source
Public debt-to-GDP ratio percent AMECo database
Government deficit-to-GDP ratio (deficit in short) percent Eurostat database
Real interest rate percent AMECo database
Real effective exchange rate percent (base 2010) World Bank database
Economic growth percent World Bank database
Inflation percent World Bank database
Current account deficit percent World Bank database
Employment rate percent World Bank database
Source: own editing
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formula; the data are provided by IMF’s14 In-
ternational Financial statistics (IFs) and data. 
Aggregation is done by median calculation 
(World Bank, 2016).
The current account balance is taken into 
account in relation to the value of GDP. The 
World Bank uses the data of the IMF year-
book, where the current account balance 
is calculated as the sum of the net export of 
products and services, and net primary and 
secondary revenues. IMF collects monthly 
data from the different countries, and aggre-
gates these into annual data for the establish-
ment of the annual current account balance.
The employment data15 used for the re-
search also come from the World Bank, which 
calculates annual weighted averages using the 
statistics of the International Labour organi-
sation (ILo). The number of the employed is 
compared with the total population. An em-
ployed is someone minimum 15 years of age 
who is able to work. A high ratio means that 
a large part of the population is employed. 
A low ratio can also mean that young people 
prefer to study (World Bank, 2016).
Real effective exchange rate is a nominal ef-
fective exchange rate adjusted with the relative 
movement of domestic prices or cost indica-
tors, that of a selected group of countries or 
the euro area. The source of World Bank data 
is IMF’s IFs database, which are calculated 
for a 2010 base. The real effective exchange 
rate is the quotient of the nominal effective 
exchange rate (i.e. the value of the currency 
relative to the weighted average of some for-
eign currencies) and the price deflator or cost 
index (World Bank, 2016).
The time series of the database was planned 
to range from 1995 to 2015, but as data were 
missing for several countries for 1995, we 
applied listwise deletion for this year, as rec-
ommended by Park (2005) and Sávai – Kiss 
(2016). Public debt data are included in the 
research for the period from 1997 to 2015, 
whereas the time series of explanatory vari-
ables are included with a delay of one year, for 
the period from 1996 to 2014.
Altogether nine countries were included in 
the research in two groups, one of these being 
the Visegrád Group, including the czech Re-
public, Hungary, Poland and slovakia. Mem-
bers of the other panel are Greece, Italy, Por-
tugal, spain and cyprus. We also wanted to 
include Ireland in the research; but in the case 
of several variables we encountered major data 
gaps, which would have distorted the results, 
therefore Ireland, was omitted.
RESUlTS
comparing the results of the panel examination 
with literature, we found that the signs of the 
coefficients of the explanatory variables thus 
received match the expectations. With the 
exception of real effective exchange rate, our 
explanatory variables proved significant. All 
values were provided as percentage points, 
which for the interpretation of the results 
means by how many percentage points the 
value of public debt-to-GDP ratio changes 
for each change of 1 percentage point of the 
value of the individual explanatory variables. 
Table 2 shows the results of the Visegrád Gro-
up. The sign of the deficit and the current ac-
count deficit is negative, which means that if 
the general government deficit or the deficit 
of the external balance rises, then government 
debt will also rise, corresponding to the results 
of Hoffmann (2011), Deli – Mosolygó (2009), 
and Czeti – Hoffmann (2008). The significant 
value of the current account deficit shows 
the fragility of the country. The real interest 
rate, GDP growth and the rise of employment 
moderates debt, as established by Tarafás 
(2016), Ono (2015) and Battaglini – Coate 
(2015) in their respective studies. Growing 
inflation leads to increasing public debt, 
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which matches the results of Miklós-Somogyi 
– Balogh (2010).
Besides the GIPs countries, we also in-
cluded cyprus in the panel (see Table 3). In 
the case of this group of countries, the cur-
rent account deficit also shows fragility, its 
negative value highlights the effect of exter-
nal debt on the growth of public debt; more-
over, it is indifferent whether the given group 
of countries is located within or outside the 
euro area. At the same time, real effective ex-
change rate did not prove significant in either 
case, which means that having an independ-
ent currency did not have any adverse effect 
as far as public debt is concerned. compar-
ing the resulting coefficients, the values of 
the GIPs and cyprus group are higher than 
those of V4 in respect of all variables. The 
major differences are in the effect of inflation, 
deficit and employment. The rise of inflation 
by one percentage point increases public 
debt by 1.7921 percent in the GIPs+cyprus 
group, but only by 0.3701 percent in the V4. 
This suggests that this group of countries was 
not protected by the – de jure – strict rules of 
the euro area from maintaining a macro envi-
ronment that inflated government debt. The 
programmes of the fiscal cooperation that 
has become closer since 2010 (e.g. European 
semester, European stability Mechanism) 
are also based on this realisation. From the 
macro sustainability aspect, euro area mem-
bership did not have any added value – given 
that there were no incentives for the member 
states before 2010 to join, apart from their 
own common sense.
SUMMARy
European countries had to face a voluminous 
increase of public debt in the course of the 
2008 crisis. several countries under review 
(Greece, Portugal, Hungary) were compelled 
to take out loan packages due to their 
financing problems. The purpose of this 
paper is to identify the factors that affect the 
development of public debt.
Table 2 
results oF the one-step dynamic panel model run  
For the visegrád group
SSR: 2028,848 Sargan test: Khi-square (59) = 56.1094 [0.5827]
coefficient standard error z p-value
Public debt in previous period 0.4511 0.0780 5.7825 <0.0001***
Constant 1.2139 0.1724 7.0419 <0.0001***
Deficit –0.5012 0.1269 –3.9487 <0.0001***
Real interest rate 0.4842 0.1754 2.7597 0.0058***
Real effective exchange rate –0.0281 0.0367 –0.7659 0.4437
GDP growth –0.3661 0.1338 –2.7372 0.0062***
Current account deficit –0.2350 0.0390 –6.0256 <0.0001***
Employment –0.6580 0.0534 –12.3227 <0.0001***
Inflation 0.3701 0.1340 2.7624 0.0057***
Note: Asterisks denote the significance level. 
Source: own calculation
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In accordance with literature, public defi-
cit, economic growth and real interest rate 
have the largest impact on public debt, which 
may also be influenced by changes in the in-
flation rate, the real exchange rate, the current 
account balance and employment. We tried to 
include as many of the variables mentioned in 
literature as possible in our empirical study. 
The subjects of the research were constituted 
by two groups of European countries whose 
members were all cohesion countries, and have 
(had) to suffer to a smaller or larger degree the 
problems arising from high public debt. one 
of these groups of countries may enjoy the ad-
vantages (and suffer the disadvantages) of is-
suing their independent currencies, while for 
the other group interest rate environment is 
determined externally (by the EcB).
As a result of the one-step dynamic panel 
model executed for both groups of countries, 
we found that most indicators defined by us 
affect public debt significantly. Deficit, infla-
tion, and the deterioration of the current ac-
count balance resulted in the increase, where-
as the growth of real interest rate and GDP 
and the improvement of employment in the 
decrease of public debt. The size of the coeffi-
cients generated for the different variables was 
smaller in the case of the Visegrád Group. Real 
effective exchange rate did not have any effect 
on public debt in either panel. Therefore, it 
can be concluded that interest rate policy was 
not decisive with regards to the effect of the 
use of the euro on public debt, whereas the 
coefficients of deficit, inflation and employ-
ment had a significantly larger effect on the 
development of public debt than what we saw 
in the case of the V4 (who carry on an inde-
pendent monetary policy).
It might be worthwhile in the future to in-
volve even more variables in the research, for 
example the loan-to-GDP or loans-to-depos-
its ratio. The latter could inform us about the 
extent to which government securities are fi-
nanced from domestic resources, but unfortu-
nately we could not find any information that 
could be arranged in time series on this. We 
might also consider examining these countries 
Table 3
results oF the one-step dynamic panel model run For the gips countries  
and cyprus
SSR: 3720,092 Sargan test: Khi-square (74) = 69.1565 [0.6376]
coefficient standard error z p-value
Public debt in previous period 0.7565 0.0577 13.1047 <0.0001***
Constant 1.1302 0.2380 4.7493 <0.0001***
Deficit –1.1185 0.2197 –5.0906 <0.0001***
Real interest rate 0.6296 0.1550 4.0608 <0.0001***
Real effective exchange rate –0.1185 0.1638 –0.7238 0.4692
GDP growth –0.4058 0.1419 –2.8592 0.0042***
Current account deficit –0.3316 0.1751 –1.8938 0.0582*
Employment –1.0145 0.0556 –18.2354 <0.0001***
Inflation 1.7921 0.4691 3.8208 0.0001***
Note: Asterisks denote the significance level.
Source: own calculation
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in a different arrangement, as the czech Re-
public, Italy and spain are IMF donor coun-
tries, therefore it might be relevant to examine 
them separately. A control group might also 
be checked with the involvement of countries 
that did not rely on financial aid in the course 
of the crisis, such as Germany, Finland or the 
Netherlands.
Notes
1 This paper has been supported by the Pallas Athéné 
Domus scientiae Foundation.
2 The creation and functioning of the mechanism 
as well as further crisis management measures are 
described in detail by Micossi et al. (2011) in their 
paper.
3 As regards the soundness of their concepts, these can 
move freely in a scale between austerity measures 
and real reforms.
4 As in our empirical research we would like to 
investigate the effect not only of economic growth, 
but of further factors as well, we cannot analyse this 
debate in more depth. Further analyses are available 
in the works of Égert (2013), Panizza – Presbitero 
(2013) and smith (2013). Barcza (2015) points out 
that the widely spread conclusion drawn from the 
article that a public debt ratio in excess of 90 per-
cent leads to an irreversible and unsustainable debt 
course is erroneous, as the purpose of the article is to 
examine the relationship between public debt and 
economic growth (slowdown).
5 In 2014-ben 35,000 signatures were collected 
and a complaint was filed against the oMT, as 
it contradicted the TFEu, therefore the German 
constitutional court referred to the court of Justice 
of the European union for judicial interpretation. 
on 14 January 2015, the court of Justice of the 
European union issued a press communiqué to the 
effect that the oMT programme of the EcB is, as a 
general rule, compatible with the TFEu (Lentner, 
2015).
6 on the basis of data available in the “czech National 
Bank ARAD data series system”.
7 The Visegrád Group consists of four cEE countries 
(the czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and slovakia) 
that entered into an agreement among themselves in 
1991.
8 As regards state intervention, the czech Republic, 
Hungary and Poland were characterised by robust 
redistribution. In the case of slovakia, the role of the 
state diminished and the ratio of public expenditures 
decreased in the period between 2000–2006 (csa-
ba, 2009). on the capitalism typology of these 
countries, a detailed overview is provided in Farkas 
(2015) and Bohle – Greskovits (2012).
9 From the initials of Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal 
and spain, cornand at al. (2016) used the acronym 
GIIPs. As Ireland is omitted from the analysis, the 
acronym GIPs is used in this paper.
10 The models examining fiscal stability define general 
government balances in different ways. Revenues 
and expenditures can be measured and aggregated by 
means of various special variables, thus accordingly the 
value of the balance may also change. For a detailed 
overview of the various balance types, see Benczes – 
Kutasi (2010), IMF (2015) and Kotosz (2016).
11 For further information on this category, see 
paragraph 7.46 of EsA 1995.
12 For further information on this category, see 
paragraphs 7.47–7.50 of EsA 1995.
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13 For further information on this category, see 
paragraph 7.51 of EsA 1995.
14 IMF calculates the consumer price index as the 
weighted average of the price changes of a special 
consumer basket, at monthly, quarterly and annual 
level (World Bank, 2016).
15 The employed and the population are defined in 
different ways by the different countries. The biggest 
differences are in the definition of working age. 
Aggregation methods may also differ due to the 
different demographic, social, legal and cultural trends 
and norms. In most countries, individuals of working 
age who live in domestic households are taken into ac-
count, except for those serving in the armed forces, or 
those serving their sentence, and the patients of mental 
institutions. In some countries, troops are taken into 
account for the calculation of the population, but are 
not included in the calculation of employment rates. 
Employment data are also calculated separately by 
gender (World Bank, 2016).
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